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In the last two years the debate on democracy in South
Africa has reached a new intensity. The unbanning of the ANC
and other opposition movements occurred at the same time as
the Cold War in Europe came to an end. Countries such as
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary that had for decades been
ruled by totalitarian regimes began to be transformed by
popular political pressure. Demands for democratic change also
escalated in South Africa during the 1980s. It finally lejtd
the South African government of F.W. De Klerk to announce in
February 1990 the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and other
opposition liberation movements and the release of Nelson
Mandela from jail. The following year the government
established the Convention for a Democratic South Africa
(CODESA) in order to negotiate a new constitution.
The pace of the changes has caught many political
analysts unawares. Craig Charney has suggested that the
failure of political scientists to predict the new turn of
events indicated wider methodological shortcomings. Much
political science analysis of South Africa in the 1980s was
still dominated, Charney has argued, by a failure to see
politics as an autonomous activity rather than as simply a
receptacle for social groups. This often results in crude
theories of the state that fail to consider it as an actor in
its own right. Moreover many political scientists still have
an overly-simplistic view of model building that depend more
on comparisons with the metropolitan core of Europe and North
American than other developing regimes in Latin American and
Asia (1).
These criticisms suggest that new approaches are needed
to explain South African political changes. The role of
democracy in South African politics especially is still rather
poorly understood by analysts despite the fact that it has
played a prominent role in political discourse since at least
the 1950s. Building a democratic state and society in South
Africa is now central, to the current South African political
agenda, though so far little work has been done to explore
this in a comparative perspective.
This paper will therefore examine the state of democratic
thinking in South Africa and the conditions that could lead to
the creation of some form of democratic regime. In the first
part, it will examine the current state of theoretical debate
over what democracy is both as an ideology and as a
description of a particular kind of political regime. The
second part of the paper will then discuss the evolution of
debate over democracy in South African politics. Finally, the
third part of the paper will look at how a South African
democratic transition might occur through a process of
political bargaining, taking into consideration similar
1. Craig Charney, "From Resistance to Reconstruction:
Towards a New Research Agenda on South African Politics",
Journal of Southern African Politics, 16, 4 (December
1990), pp. 761-770
processes in other regimes moving out of political
authoritarianism.
The methodological approach of this paper is one that
seeks to learn from the past both in terms of the general
formulation of democratic theory and its application to South
African conditions. Hitherto social analysts and historians
have tended to be preoccupied with the genesis and development
of different concepts in South African politics such as
segregation, liberalism, apartheid and nationalism. Democracy
has frequently been seen as tangential to these other
doctrines despite its considerable impact on political debate.
The emergence of a new international climate favourable to
democratisation following the end of the Cold War offers up
the opportunity for a re-evaluation of the South African past
in terms of democratic ideas and values (2).
Processes of democratisation, however, tend to be open-
ended. The fluid political situation that has emerged since
the late 1980s suggests that there are a number of different
routes out of the current South African political crisis and
it is overly simplistic to assume-that modernisation
automatically leads to democratisation (3). As James M. Molloy
has pointed out in the case of Latin America, there is no
particular reason for supposing that either democracy or .
authoritarian modes of rule are necessarily anomalous, hard
though this may be for democratic political activists to
accept. Both modes of rule have lived alongside each other for
decades in Latin America with cyclical swings from one variant
to the other (4).
Democratic discourse in modern societies interacts with
other discourses such as liberalism and nationalism. As the
final part of this paper suggests, the evolution of democratic
discourse amongst the radical intelligentsia may well enhance
popular pressure against an undemocratic regime, though this
may ultimately take the path of authoritarian nationalism
2. This is in accord with the view that the chief function
of historical research is not to reveal innate historical
laws but to debunk historical myths which the present may
have about itself. See the recent article by Charles
Maisels, "Picking up the relics on the long path back".
The Times Higher Education Supplement. June 12 1992.
3. See for example, Charles Simpkins, The Prisoners of
Tradition and the Politics of Nation Building.
Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1988, p. 1.
4. James M. Molloy, "The Politics of Transition in Latin
America" in James M. Molloy and Mitchell A Seligson
(eds), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in
Latin America. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1987, p. 236; see also Guillermd O'Donnell,
"Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the
Bureaucratic Authoritarian State", Latin American
Research Review. 13, (1978), pp. 3-38.
rather than democracy. It would be foolhardy indeed to see
dempcratisation in South Africa as part of some inherent
paradigmatic process (5). When political outcomes are
successful they are due mainly to human agency rather than the
operation of inexorable historical laws.
The role of democratic theory:
The role of human agency in the democratisation process
in fact starts at the level of theory. Democracy serves as
both a set of normative values by which to judge the operation
of a political system as well as the empirical description of
a particular system's behaviour. As a set of normative values,
democracy as a term has been considerably devalued in
political discourse by its continual misusage. In the course
of the nineteenth century it spread world-wide as a result of
European imperial expansion. By the mid-twentieth century it
became the effective yardstick of good state behaviour, or
more particularly of good state intentions. As John Dunn has
cryptically remarked, democracy has become "the moral
Esperanto of the present nation-state system, the language in
which all Nations are truly united" (6).
Democratic theory has been continually dogged by a major
internal contradiction. In its original form in Classical
Greece it meant rule by "the people" even if this did exclude
women and slaves. The idea of direct popular government
exerted a continuing hold on democrats when the idea of
democracy began to revived in European political thought in
the eighteenth century Enlightenment. Jean Jacques Rousseau
saw direct democracy in small egalitarian communities as one
possible ideal, though he considered that it would be
impossible to accomplish and preferred the other more viable
alternative of arbitrary and unlimited personal rule (7). This
has not stopped Rousseau's social thought from being
subsequently interpreted as providing the moral justification
for "pure" democracy by a citizenry that felt it could
dispense with legislators.
However, as societies in Europe developed from the
eighteenth century onwards it became impossible to give
anything more than a token gesture towards the basic
democratic principle of direct popular rule. Democratic theory,
increasingly veered towards the notion of democratic
representation by which a group of people elected
5. For a strong attack on paradigmatic thinking in the
social sciences, specially in third world and developing
settings see Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Search for
Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding", World
Politics. 22 (March 1970), p. 338.
6. John Dunn, Western Political Theory in the face of the
Future. Cambridge, C.U.P., 1979, p. 2.
7.. Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau's
Social Theory. Cambridge, C.U.P., 1987, pp. 132-3
representatives to perform on their behalf the activities of
government. It was this notion of representative government
which defined the Victorian notion of democracy. John Stuart
Mill in his essay Representative Government in 1861 saw the
representative principle embodying the most morally acceptable
form of modern polity for it cultivated active as opposed to
passive mental qualities in a group of people. Representative
government was a moral ideal that entailed the whole people of
a country ultimately exercising "controlling power" over their
legislators. It was a power which the people "must possess in
all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they
please, of all the operations of government" (8).
Mill was rather doubtful of the longer-term implications
of representative government since he feared that it could
lead to the majority part of any population dominating a
minority. This would mean that democracy would "not even
attain its ostensible object" since it would lead to power
being given to "a majority of the majority; who may be, and
often are, but a minority of the whole" (9). The continued
extension of the franchise was also likely to mean that
representative government would have a "natural tendency"
towards "collective mediocrity" since it would entail power
being placed "in the hands of classes more and more below the
highest level of instruction in the community" (10).
Mill's theory of democratic representation was of major
importance for later analysts in political science for it
tried to reconcile rule by an elite with some form of
democratic accountability (11). Mill favoured a system of
plural voting to ensure that the voice of an educated minority
was heard in a democratic parliament and he also championed
the extension of local government as an educational training
ground for schooling the majority population into the ethics
of "good government". There were, though, elements of his
thought that pointed to the development of structures of
political participation beyond the national parliament into
areas such as the workplace and local government (12).
This theme of participatory democracy extended into
twentieth century political thought, particularly via the
theorists of Guild Socialism such as G.D.H. Cole and A.R.
Orage and pluralists such as J.N. Figgis and the young Harold
Laski. Mainstream democratic theory in Europe and North
America, however, tended to became increasingly undermined by













11. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory,
Cambridge, C.U.P., 1970, p. 32.
12. Ibid., p. 35.
the powers of the central government. Mounting class conflict
in the years before and after World War One lead a number of
democratic political theorists into receptualising the role of
the state. The ideas of late nineteenth century liberal
idealists such as T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet revised the
negative idea of liberty, which had been prevalent in the
period of high Victorianism, into a doctrine of positive
liberty that could be secured though state action geared to
promoting the "common good" (13). This doctrine was
disseminated among groups of liberals, Fabians and Social
Democrats and helped underpin the idea of the welfare state
(14).
In the United States, the growth of political science in
the 1930s and 1940s at the time of the New Deal also
reinforced this elitist conception of democracy. The Austrian
theorist Joseph Schumpeter had a considerable influence on
this emerging political science discipline with his magnum
opus Capitalism. Socialism and Democracy that was first
published in 1942. Here he attacked what he called the
"classical doctrine" of democracy for failing to understand
empirically how electorates behaVe. The classical doctrine had
its roots in the eighteenth century notion of theorists such
as Rousseau that there was a "common good", though this had
been developed by nineteenth century utilitarian theorists
into a rational basis for democracy. Schumpeter argued that
this notion failed to account for-the fact that the range of
different goals and values within an electorate made it
impossible to agree on a common good through rational
argument. As societies developed industrially it was
impossible to sustain the notion of a "general will" because
of the growing divergence of interests. Governments themselves
were also able to contrive in many instances a "manufactured
will" (15) .
Schumpeter. considered that democracy should be understood
as being less an ideology than a political method intelligible
in terms of an empirical theory. This he defined as an
"institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote" (16). This
"empirical" theory had a major impact on sociology and
political science over the following twenty years or more,
though critics pointed out that it also contained normative
13. See for example Stefan Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and
the state: philosophical idealism and political argument
in England, 1880-1915", Past and Present. 72, (1976), pp.
86-111.
14. Peter Clarke, Liberals and Social Democrats, Cambridge,
C.U.P., 1978.
15 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.
London, Allen and Unwin, 1943, esp. pp. 250-68
16. Ibid., p. 269.
dimensions and focused on a narrow range of features of
democratic government that were then dominant in a number of
societies in the West (17). It encouraged political scientists
such as Robert A. Dahl and Seymour Martin Lipset to focus upon
democracy as less of a system of values than as a method of
social control over political elites. Indeed, Dahl
rechristened modern democracy "polyarchy" and argued that
elections and political competition did not "make for
government by majorities in any very significant way, but they
vastly increase the size, number, and variety of minorities in'
making policy choices" (18).
This redefinition tended to reinforce a conservative and
elitist theory of democracy. Schumpeter's original
conceptualisation of elitist democratic theory owed much to
his idealised conception of the pre-war British governing
class. He considered that this class, trained as it was in
public schools, had a particular acumen for coping with the
stresses of mass politics given its general level of education
and culture. It appeared to have performed far better than the
German ruling class which led Germany into the disasters of
the Third Reich (19).
Schumpeter's model, however, was used by his followers in
the 1950 to sustain a rather different set of objectives. It
accorded with the Cold War climate in which many liberal
social scientists perceived an "end of ideology" in western
societies. Western liberal democratic societies were seen to
be not only cohesive and free of any major conflict over
values but also to exemplify the positive virtue of political
apathy and non-participation, which was functional to the
democratic process by reducing the level of electoral demand
on governments (20). This approach shifted the focus away from
the potentiality of individual citizens to the needs of the
political system as a whole. Empirical theorists generally
failed to consider that new social movements might arise
within the citizenry with fresh demands to make on the
political elite. By the 1960s, with the advent of the Civil
Rights movement in the US and student activism accompanying
the US involvement in the Vietnam War, the empirical theory
seemed increasingly incapable of explaining political change
17. David Held, Models of Democracy. Oxford, Polity Press,
1987, pp. 164-5.
18. Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago
and London, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 132.
19. Herbert Doring, "Schumpeter's Britain - Forty years On"
West European Politics. 6 1 (July 1983), pp. 5-19
20. W.H. Morris Jones, "In Defence of Apathy", Political
Studies. 11 (1954), pp. 25-37.
in western democracies, let alone in post-colonial societies
of the developing world (21).
In the last twenty years political scientists in the west
have begun to recognise that a new theory of democracy is
needed to explain changes both at the national and global
levels. The rise of free market liberalism in the late 1970s
and 1980s has dissolved the old corporatist consensus that
underpinned the older elitist theory of democracy. Some
analysts have seen a continuing role for theories of direct
and participatory democracy, though this will require control
over the role of money and the manipulation of voters through
the media (22). The rise of human rights discourse at the
international level also suggests that democratic theory will
have to be recast in terms of a global theory of democracy
incorporating certain basic democratic rights and demands.
This faces the difficult task of reconciling the cosmopolitan
demands for a universal code of human rights with the demands
for national self-determination (23).
The increasingly contested nature of democratic theory
has lead some analysts to question the conclusions of the
political sociologists on the social and economic
preconditions necessary for democratisation. Scholars of
political modernisation in the late 1950s and 1960s tended to
link democratic transformation with indices of
industrialisation, education, wealth and education. The
passage to democracy appeared to be interlinked with a
society's shift, in Weberian terms, from traditional to legal
rational authority. This Eurocentric approach lead to a gloomy
forecast for democratic transformation in developing states in
Asia and Africa. The transformation that would occur in these
states would, Lipset wrote in 1959, lead to a situation in
which "an educated minority uses a mass movement expressing
leftist slogans to exercise effective control, and holds
elections as a gesture toward ultimate democratic objectives,
21. For criticisms of the empirical theory see Graeme Duncan
and Steven Lukes, "The New Democracy", Political Studies.
11 91963), pp. 156-77; Lane Davis, "The Cost of Realism"'
Western Political Quarterly, 17 (1964), pp. 37-46; Jack
L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of
Democracy", American Political Science ReviPwf 60 (June
1966), pp. 285-95, 391-92 all repr. in Henry S. Kariel
(ed), Frontiers of Democratic ThPnrY) New York, random
House, pp. 188-247
22. Erkki Berndtson, "American Democracy in the 1990s: the
End of the Cold War and its Impact on Democratic Theory
in the United States", paper presented to the ECPR Joint
Workshops, University of Limerick, Ireland, March 30-
April 4 1992, p. 13.
23. See the discussion in Carol C. Gould, Rethinking
Democracy, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1988, pp. 307-28.
and as a means of estimating public opinion, not as effective
instruments for legitimate turnover in governing parties" (24)
In the course of the 1970s and 1980s a number of analysts
became dissatisfied with this gloomy prognosis for developing
societies. It did not appear to fit the facts for some
countries with military or authoritarian regimes, such as
Argentina, Brazil and the Philippines, which did manage to
undergo democratisation, albeit after considerable periods of
political conflict. Democratic theory has appeared to provide
no ready-made answers as to why some regimes democratised and
others did not. Critical or revisionist analysts of elitist
democratic theory have thus begun to look at the strategies
employed by those seeking a democratic political
transformation rather than underlying theories of democracy
per se (25). For some political scientists this means that the
main focus of attention is bargains forged at the elite level
since it is almost never the actual crusaders of democracy who
forge the final democratic compromise (26).
Attention has turned in recent years towards the
bargaining strategies involved in the democratisation process.
Giuseppe Di Palma has pointed out in a recent study To Craft
Democracies that leaders of states may move away from
authoritarianism to bargaining over a new democratic political
for the most cynical of political purposes. Attempts to
suppress internal opposition may well have failed to stem an
escalating crisis and this in turn leads to growing divisions
within the ruling regime. The splits may be of an
institutional nature or be generational in origin. They can be
enough though to force the regime to seek a new political
24. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Legitimacy", American Political Science Review, Llll
(March 1959), p. 101.
25. Dankwurt A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy",
Comparative Politics. 2, 3 (April 1970), pp. 337-363;
Myron Weiner, "Empirical Democratic Theory and the
Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy", PS, (Fall
1987) , pp. 861-66
26. "...the passionate dissidents from authoritarian rule and
the crusaders for democratic principles, the Tom Paine of
this world, do not create democratic institutions",
Huntingdon has written "that requires James Madisons.
Those institutions come into existence through
negotiations and compromises among political elites
calculating their own interests and desires". Samuel
Huntingdon, "Will More Countries become Democratic?",
Political Science Quarterly. 9, 2 (Summer 1984), p. 212.
equilibrium necessitating bargaining and negotiations with
opposition groups over a new constitution (27).
It is such situations like these, Di Palma has suggested,
that group behaviour becomes increasingly unpredictable. While
the hardliners on both sides may keep rigidly to their
positions, the solidarity of the group will be undermined as
its actions become contingent on perceptions of the other
parties to the conflict. If the ruling regime does finally
decide to opt for political bargaining rather than falling
back onto traditional methods of repression, it is because the
older certainties have gone. The bargain's open endedness
makes it ultimately a less costly option (28).
Di Palma's innovative study is useful for its focus upon
the voluntaristic nature of political bargaining processes.
However, it tends to adopt a top-down approach which neglects
the social forces that are pressuring the ruling regime from
below. While elites may strike a bargain in isolation from
mass pressure, this needs to be empirically confirmed rather
than theoretically asserted (29). The approach can be
complemented by more historical analysis of the growth of
democratic intelligentsias and the way these have shaped the
formation of democratic political discourse. It is this
dimension which is of such importance in understanding the
nature of political conflict in South Africa and the degree to
which it represents a struggle for democracy.
The development of democratic discourse in South Africa:
The development of democratic thinking in South Africa
has tended to be submerged in analyses of South African
liberalism. This has led critics to characterise the
mainstream liberal tradition in South Africa as essentially
undemocratic and prone to making accommodation by the early
twentieth century with the ideology of segregation (30). In
response, some liberal historians such as Rodney Davenport
have pointed out that the South African liberal tradition
27. Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on
Democratic Transitions. Berkeley and Los Angeles,
University of California Press, 1990, p. 34.
28. Ibid.. p. 43.
29. See the criticisms in Daniel H. Levine, "Paradigm Lost:
Dependence to Democracy", World Politics. 40 (April
1988), pp. 377-394
30. Martin Legassick, "The Rise of Modern Liberalism: Its
Assumptions and Social Base", London, ICS seminar paper,
1973; Paul B. Rich, White Power and the Liberal
Conscience, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1984. See also Saul Dubow, Racial Sqreaation and the
Origins of Apartheid. London and Basingstoke, The
Macmillan Press, 1989, stressing that many white liberals
favoured social control rather than segregation per se.
10
really contained more than one strand. There was one sub-
branch which was quite Whiggish in its nostalgia for the slow
and evolutionary methods of the British model of parliamentary
government and another sub-branch that veered towards a
democratic discourse based upon notions of right derived from
the French and American revolutions (31).
The first sub-branch of Whiggish liberalism tended to
dominate political debate in the circles of the English-
speaking white and black intelligentsia in the years before
World War Two. Until the removal of the Cape African
electorate from the common roll in 1936 the Cape liberal
tradition that stretched back to the middle nineteenth century
still had concrete embodiment in South African politics. For
the following decade, a considerable part of black political
leadership was persuaded to accept the alternative experiment
in African political representation through the Natives
Representative Council and the white "natives representatives"
in the Senate and House of Assembly (32). Many African leaders
continued to uphold Whiggish liberal ideas. James Calata, for
example, president of the Cape African Congress, failed to
refer to democratic demands at all in his address to the
Congress in July 1938. Instead he referred to the centenary of
the 1828 Proclamation freeing Cape Coloured labour as "the
'magna Charta'(sic) of the Hottentots system of government
which equalised all His Majesty's subjects without regard to
colour or race". He looked confidently to the "steady rise of
liberalism" in the cities helped by the press and the Joint
Council movement (33).
By the middle of the Second World War, a more militant
nationalist consciousness began to intrude into ANC politics.
The 1942 ANC document African Claims was a landmark in the
emergence of a democratic as opposed to a liberal
consciousness in the Congress leadership. The document was the
product of a committee chaired by Z.K. Matthews. It was formed
31. Rodney Davenport, "The Cape Liberal Tradition to 1910" in
Jeffery Butler, Richard Elphick and David Welsh (eds),
Democratic Liberalism in South Africa: Its History and
Prospect. Middletown (Conn), Wesleyan University Press,
1987, p. 29. Some analysts have pointed to a basic
philosophical distinction between the American revolution
which gave more importance to liberty and the French
revolution which stressed equality. See George Sabine,
"Two Democratic Traditions", The Philosophical Review.
LX1, 4 (October 1952), pp. 451- 474.
32. Mirjana Roth, "The Natives Representative Council, 1937-
1951", Ph.D Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand,
1987.
33. Alfred Xuma Papers. Church of the Province Archives,
University of the Witwatersrand, ABX 380704 James Calata,
Presidential Address read at the Conference of the Cape
African Congress held at New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, on
Monday 4 July 1938.
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to apply the principles of citizenship announced in the 1941
Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roosevelt and Winston
Churchill, to South African conditions. The document
considered that African people came under Point 3 of the
Charter which proclaimed the "right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under which they live". This meant that
Congress now rejected the trusteeship principle that Africans
were the wards of white colonial trustees in South Africa and
instead demanded full citizenship rights in a single South
African society. The document contained a Bill of Rights that
outlined the nature of these citizenship rights that were
demanded for all adults in South Africa. They included a
universal franchise as well as economic and social rights such
as equal pay for equal work, the right to belong to trade
unions and to strike and the right to equal health and medical
care (34).
African Claims was a major statement of liberal
democratic principles that was in advance of much of white
liberal discourse at this time in South Africa. Many white
liberals in the course of the 1930s reacted negatively to the
tide of fascism in Europe and advancing Afrikaner nationalism
in South Africa. When they did consider the issue of extending
democratic structures in South Africa they urged mechanisms to
prevent rule by an unchecked majority. In 1938 the historian
Arthur Keppel Jones urged a quasi-consociational system of
"estates" each of which would have "absolute rights guaranteed
against the other, and none of which can exercise any
functions of sovereignty without the separate consent of the
other" (35). He urged that the NRC's powers should be extended
to make it a legislative rather than an advisory body so that
matters of common interest would have to pass both the NRC and
the white parliament with neither body being able to over-ride
the other (36).
These sentiments were in keeping with the more general
philosophical drift of white South African liberalism
articulated by R.F.A. Hoernle in his 1939 Phelps Stokes
lectures South African Native Policy and the Liberal Spirit.
Hoernle was centrally concerned in defending what he termed
the "liberal spirit" in South Africa from nationalist attack.
He argued that liberalism would probably best be able to
survive if some process of complete racial separation occurred
so that liberal values could be fostered in each racial group.
Hoernle had virtually nothing to say about how democratic
accountability might be fostered within this process of racial
separation. His lectures reflected how a considerable part of
34. African National Congress, African Claims in South
Africa. Johannesburg, 1943.
35. Arthur Keppel Jones, "A Positive Plea for Democracy", The
Forum May 9 1938 and "The Majority steam Roller", ibid,
30 1938
36. Arthur Keppel Jones, "A Federal Constitution in South
Africa", The Forum June 6 1938
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the white liberal establishment in the South African Institute
of Race Relations and the Joint Council movement tended to
avoid direct involvement with organising movements for popular
democratic political mobilisation. Instead they concentrated
upon welfare work and assistance in forming economic bodies
such a cooperatives and trade unions (37) .
The timidity of the white liberals encouraged a steady
drift of African elite opinion into a more radical democratic
camp by the post-war years. In the absence of a focused
liberal voice on democratisation, it became increasingly
difficult for the leadership of the ANC to avoid responding to
more radical voices from the Congress Youth league that called
for active measures of popular resistance against segregation
and apartheid. This became evident in the wake of the removal
of the moderate President of the Alfred Xuma in 1949 by the
Youth League activists and the approval by the Congress of the
Programme of Action. It motivated Z.K. Matthews to seek an
alternative strategy to the old Whiggish one of deputations,
petitions and parliamentary lobbying, particularly as his son
Joe had been an active member Youth League member at Fort Hare
before becoming a member of the South African Communist Party.
In 1953, following the failure of the Defiance Campaign to
alter the direction of government policy, Matthews suggested
that the ANC take the initiative in organising a Congress of
the People (COP) in order to pass a people's charter of
rights. He appears to have conceived the idea as a way of
convening a popular gathering to reaffirm their support for
the basic liberal democratic demands of African Claims. The
suggestion was quickly taken up by the ANC leadership who were
keen to regain the momentum of the Defiance Campaign the
previous year. In the event it was the white radicals
organised through COD who did most of the organisation of the
Congress as well as dominating the committee that produced the
first draft of the Freedom Charter. Z.K. Matthews became
disaffected from the increasingly radical drift of the COP and
did not even attend the Kliptown meeting in June 1955 that
passed the Freedom Charter (38) .
COD's role was significant in the early 1950s in steering
the ANC leadership in the direction of the model of national
liberation. Some Youth Leaguers such as A.P. Mda had talked in
general terms of this in the 1940s, but the COD intellectuals
gave it a coherence it had not previously had. The atmosphere
in COD was strongly shaped by the more general debate which
had developed in Communist Party circles following the
outlawing of the Communist Party of South Africa in 1950.
37. For an analysis of Hoernle's thought and its impact see
Paul B. Rich, Hope and Despair: English Speaking
Intellectuals and South African Politics, 1986-1976,
London, British Academic Press, 1992, esp. chap two.
38. For a detailed analysis of this see Paul B. Rich, "The
Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter", paper
presented to the AFSAAP annual conference, University of
Western Australia, Perth, 1-4 December 1991.
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Between 1950 and 1953 when the party was reformed underground
as the South African Communist Party (SACP) an extensive
debate took place over whether the political struggle in South
Africa was really a class or a national one. Much of the
initiative for this was taken by the party's former members in
the Transvaal such as Michael Harmel and Rusty Bernstein who
tended to have closer links with the Youth League radicals in
the ANC compared to the more Cape-based leadership of the
CPSA. This resulted in a compromise formula that the South
African struggle was one of "colonialism of a special type".
This went a considerable way towards acknowledging the
nationalist demands of the CYL though it angered some of the
more purist party members who saw the situation in terms of
class struggle (39).
The SACP position also incorporated, alongside the
"colonialism of a special type" formula, the more traditional
Leninist notion of a "two stage" struggle with the first stage
leading to "bourgeois liberal democracy" before the second
stage of advance to full-scale socialism. This strategy
reinforced the generally pragmatic outlook that prevailed in
COD towards the Congress of the People. Bernstein in
particular warned his colleagues against trying to impose
ideological blueprints which might have been possible "in
other times before the opposing forces have presented
themselves so forcibly". To do so now "would be to isolate
ourselves from the forces that are already in action for
democratic advance and to attempt to superimpose our ideas,
our visions, on what they have already tried and found to be
unworkable. We have to work with what we have" (emphasis
added) (40).
"Working with what we have" still indicated a rather
manipulative outlook. The Marxist theorists in COD tended to
view themselves as having a role as the ideological vanguard
of a South African revolution necessitating general popular
mobilisation. However, the death of Stalin in 1953 lead to a
slow thawing of Soviet views on national liberation struggles
in the course of the 1950s. The SACP appears to have felt that
it could afford to ally itself with nationalists in the ANC
and other bodies in the Congress alliance and steer them in
the direction of radical social democratic political demands
(41).
39. David Everett, "Alliance Politics of a Special Type: the
roots of the ANC/SACP Alliance 1950-1954", Journal of
Southern African Studies, 18, 1 (March 1991), pp. 19-39.
40. Carter Karis Collection. Reel #2D C2:30/2 L. Bernstein,
"The Road to Liberty", speech at 1953 COD conference.
41. Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades Against
Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party
in Exile. London, James Currey and Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1992, p. 27.
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The Freedom Charter passed at the Congress of the People
at Kliptown in June 1955 illustrated this drift of democratic
thought. The first draft of the Charter emerged just two days
before the Kliptown meeting from a committee of the National
Action Council of the COP that included COD activists such as
Joe Slovo. Piet Beyleveld, Lionel Bernstein and Rica Hodgson.
The first draft of the Charter had a vision of close popular
control over the organs of government. "The bonds between the
people, the organs of public opinion and their elected
representatives", it declared, "should be close, and
consultation between the people and their representatives
should prevail at all levels and at all times" (42) . This was
changed by the final draft to the more representational notion
that South Africa was a "democratic state, based on the will
of all the people". This vision of democracy was closely
linked to a wider programme of economic and social change
involving wide-scale nationalisation. The Charter was
essentially a populist democratic statement in which the
"national wealth" of South Africa including banks and
"monopoly industry" should be "restored to the people".
The language of the Charter has had a profound impact on
the evolution of democratic discourse in South Africa. It
contained many principles which were basic to liberal values
such as a universal franchise, equality before the law and the
abolition of racially discriminatory legislation. However,
there were also features of it which marked a major
ideological break with the precepts of Whiggish liberalism.
Democracy was seen in Congress circles as part of a wider
vision of a new South African political order that broke with
the past. It appeared that the existing political system would
not extend political rights to Africans and this necessitated
the construction of an alternative formulation. In the 1950s
this was frequently termed a "multi-racial society" though
this subsequently became changed to the idea of a "non racial
society" and a "non racial democracy". These developments had
a considerable impact on black political debate.
The notion of "non racial democracy" had rather a
tutelary quality to it. The concept embraced a vision of the
future that entailed changing popular attitudes towards race.
Albert Luthuli, one of the most prominent exponents of this
democratic ideal, expounded this as part of a wider Utopian
vision on global lines, "...in trying to build a new
homogeneous democratic South Africa, he declared in 1958,
"colour and race should not come into the scene. It should not
come into the scene in any part of the world; for men should
be bound together by certain values which they cherish" (43).
42. Treason Trial Mss, Church of the Province Archives
University of the Witwatersrand, AD1812 Eg4-1 draft of
the Freedom Charter, n.d.
43. Albert Luthuli, "Our Vision is a Democratic South Africa"
address to The Congress of Democrats, Johannesburg, 1958,
rep. in The Road to Freedom Is Via the Cross. London,
African National Congress, n.d. p. 52.
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This Utopian democratic language developed at a time when
the ANC had no political leverage with the state. There
appeared to be no avenues by which any of its ideals could be
realised within existing governmental structures. For liberals
committed to evolutionary and reformist change, this drift of
thought was a profound political challenge. The government's
assault on civil and political liberties as it tried to
achieve its apartheid vision appeared to be undermining the
very idea of constitutional government. As Alan Paton wrote to
Leo Marquard at the end of 1956, "I really cannot believe that
we are living in a constitutional era". It was essential, he
felt, to try and mobilise a body of opinion to counter this
and to reaffirm its belief in constitutional goals of limited
government:
By all means let us affirm our faith in constitutional
government - perhaps that is what we have failed to do -
but do let us realise the real nature of the authority
under which we are living now. My own view is that
massive evolutionary changes must come, and to my mind a
non-racial body of opinion devoted to the ideals of
democracy is the only force which will be able to guide
such an evolution without allowing it to fall into the
hands of evil men (44).
Efforts were made in the late 1950s to form a body of
opinion behind constitutional political evolution such as the
Multi Racial Conference at the University of the Witwatersrand
in November 1957 (45). In the late 1950s, furthermore, a
realignment of liberalism occurred following the defection of
a small group from the United Party and the creation of the
Progressive Party in 1959. At the same time the Liberal Party
began to move away from its previous parliamentary focus to
embrace other political methods. In 1960 the party finally
embraced a universal adult franchise (46).
A period of re-assessment began to occur within South
African liberalism. One of the liberal grandees from the Cape,
the former Natives Representative Donald Molteno, attacked
Hoernle's vision of racial separationism. He stressed that it
was more importance for liberal aims to be realised through
pressures for a progressive democratisation of South African
society than to hope that these could be achieved by
collaborating with state policies of racial segregation or
apartheid. He dismissed Hoernle's three alternative strategies
44. Leo Marquard Papers, Jagger Library, University of Cape
Town, BC587.E2.25, A. Paton to L. Marquard 4 December
1956.
45. Paul B. Rich, "Doctrines of Change" in John D. Brewer
(ed), Can South Africa Survive?f London and Basingstoke,
The Macmillan Press, 1989, pp. 295-6.
46. Janet Robertson, Liberalism in South Africa, 1948-1963.
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 197.
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for liberalism of parallellism, separation or assimilation as
politically impracticable (47). Molteno though was still
unwilling to support a universal franchise and looked back
rather nostalgically to 1936 when the All African Convention,
formed to fight the destruction of the Cape African franchise,
was still willing to accept a qualified franchise (48).
Molteno went on to chair the Molteno Report for the
Progressive Party that recommended a qualified franchise,
though he failed to gain any major African representation of
the committee for even moderates such as Z.K. Matthews, Alfred
Xuma and Paul Mosaka declined to sit on it (49).
The internal logic of South African political debate on
democracy had thus gone a long way to isolate the Whig
liberals even before the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960
destroyed what was left of the political middle ground. The
model of national liberation increasingly set the agenda of
political debate and even spread to the Liberal Party in the
form of the small and quixotic African Resistance Movement. In
exile the ANC moved to a strategy of guerrilla struggle in
order to forcibly overthrow the South African state. The
document Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress
that was passed at the 1969 Morogoro congress emphasised the
theme of national mobilisation as opposed to extending
democracy and illustrated that the movement had now taken on
all the trappings of a third world national liberation
movement. The document stressed the need for a "scientific
revolutionary strategy" that demanded the "maximum
mobilisation of the African people as a dispossessed and
racially oppressed nation". There was a special role for the
working class in this struggle for it was "inconceivable for
liberation to have meaning without a return of the wealth of
the land to the people as a whole". "National emancipation",
therefore, meant more than "formal political democracy" since
"to allow the existing economic forces to retain their
interests intact is to feed the root of racial supremacy and
does not even represent the shadow of liberation" (50). The
document appears to have sustained the view the capitalism was
inextricably linked to racism, though the ANC subsequently
moved to a more pragmatic position on this by the 1980s.
Inside South Africa, the debate among liberals over
democracy continued even after the voluntary liquidation of
the Liberal Party in 1968 when the Prohibition of Political
47. Donald Molteno, Toward a Democratic South Africa,
Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1959.
48. Donald B. Molteno, The Betrayal of Natives
Representation. Johannesburg, 1959, p. 15.
49. Davis Scher, Donald Molteno, Johannesburg, SAIRR and
Donald Molteno Memorial Committee, 1979, p. 83.
50. Forward to Freedom: Strategy and Tactics of the African
National Congress. Morogoro, African National Congress,
n.d (1969), p, 16.
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Interference Act made multi-racial political parties illegal.
By this time many liberals had become disillusioned with the
Whig model of parliamentary government and its capacity to
underpin the rule of law. As a recent study has shown, Alan
Paton had begun to move by this time towards championing an
American constitutional model based on a separation of powers,
a Bill of Rights and a Supreme Court (51).
More detailed and specialised debate on the nature of a
post-apartheid constitutional dispensation took place in the
early 1970s when a series of study commissions were
established by the project backed by the South African Council
of Churches called the Study Project on Christianity in
Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS). The report of the SPRO-CAS
Political Commission South Africa's Political Alternatives in
1973 stressed the need for a two-phased strategy of devolution
of power away from the central state to local, regional or
communal levels. The report was an important document for
democratic liberal thinking since it emphasised the need to
limit the central government's powers in a post-apartheid
polity. It had a rather different emphasis to the Charterists
in the ANC who tended to urge strong state control of the
economy in order to fulfil egalitarian goals of wealth
distribution. Its advocacy of "open pluralism" did not gain
the support of the one radical figure on the Commission, Rick
Turner, who refused to sign it and wrote an alternative vision
of communal socialism in his book The Eye of the Needle in
1973 (52).
The phased process of devolution of power suggested by
South Africa's Political Alternatives indicated a new
direction for South African liberals who were anxious to move
out of the Whig tradition. Various federalist ideas began to
be debated over the course of the next decade. Some observers
hoped that these might lead to a quasi-functionalist process
developing based upon small-scale and localised bargains which
would progressively undermine the monolithic control of the
central state (53). Most of these negotiations, though, did
not involve the township and trade union movements but focused
more on ethnic groups like Jnkatha and the proposal by the
Buthelezi Commission for a Natal based option of
consociational power sharing (54). Moreover, the format of the
51. Michael Black, "Alan Paton and the Rule of Law", African
Affairs, 91, (1991) p. 71.
52. Hope and Despair, esp. chap. four.
53. I. William Zartman, "Negotiations in South Africa", The
Washington Quarterly. Autumn 1988, pp. 141-58; Samuel P.
Huntingdon, "Reform and Stability in a Modernizing, Multi
Ethnic Society" in Peter Collins (ed), Thinking About
South Africa. Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
1990, pp. 67-96
54. Roger Southall, "Buthelezi, Inkatha and the Politics of
Compromise", African Affairs, 80, (1981),
18
debate on federalism tended to occur within small gatherings
and conferences of professionals, usually academics, and
failed to impact on the radical black intelligentsia in the
townships (55).
The top-down quality of the constitutional engineering
that was suggested in South Africa's Political Alternatives
rather distanced it from the radical black intelligentsia that
was beginning to emerge in the townships in the late 1970s and
1980s. The rise of the Black Consciousness movement indicated
a search for a strategy of black self-reliance and a break
with the paternalistic liberalism that was still evident in
organisations such as the SAIRR. In a number of respects this
was another phase in the evolution of black nationalist
consciousness in South Africa and the debate on whether to
seek integration into a common South African society or search
for a separate African political and cultural identity. Given
this central focus of concern, BC ideologues failed to find a
strongly democratic voice, and the offshoots of the movement
such as the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania and AZAPO
appropriated the language of "national democratic revolution"
from the Congress Alliance (56).
It was the emergence of the UDF after 1983 which gave a
renewed impetus to the democratic discourse of the Freedom
Charter- The Front reflected a broad range of popular opinion,
though Tom Lodge noted the general absence of businessmen and
traders on its national executive. Its leaders tended to be
representative of the intellectual middle class who had become
active in organising movements of the poor. Though it had a
socialist wing, the general tone of UDF activists was populist
in a manner that hearkened back to the Congress Alliance of
the 1950s. The central thrust of much UDF rhetoric was
"national democracy" which did not mean "bourgeois democracy"
but a rather romantic conception of the popular will that was
often linked with a "voluntaristic" conception of political
struggle (57). Some UDF leaders championed direct as opposed
to indirect democracy as their ultimate aim for South Africa.
Murphy Morobe, the Acting Publicity Secretary, declared for
instance in May 1987 this would ensure "mass participation
rather than passive docility and ignorance, a momentum where
ordinary people feel they can do their job themselves, rather
55. For muted criticism of this approach see Terence Beard,
"Constitutions and Constitutional Change", Reality. 10 3
(May 1978), pp. 10-14
56. Robert Fatton, Black Consciousness in South Africa.
Albany, State University of New York Press, 1986, p. 130;
see also Nigel Gibson, "Black Consciousness 1977-1987:
the Dialectics of Liberation in South Africa", Africa
Today, 35, 1 (1st Qtr. 1988), pp. 5-26
57. Tom Lodge, "The United Democratic Front: Leadership and
Ideology", paper presented at the African Studies
Institute, University of the Witwatersrand, 24 August
1987, p. 14.
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than waiting for their local MP to intercede on their behalf"
(58).
The demands of the Freedom Charter also provided the
basis for a political identity to some of the youth movements
that began to spring up in the townships in the 1980s and
which were loosely linked to the UDF. Charles Carter has shown
how the Alexandra Youth Congress (AYCO) leaders adopted the
Freedom Charter in 1983 as a guiding policy document. This
provided them with a political flag that distinguished their
movement from rivals such as the Ditshwantsho tsa Rona. The
precepts of the Freedom Charter underpinned a dogma based upon
the "national democratic strategy" which was a concept that
was taken for granted. This also encouraged an outlook of
democratising the means as well as the ends of political
struggle. As one AYCO newsletter pointed out, the "struggle
for national democracy has to be democratic in process" (59).
The radical intellectuals who expounded the Charterist
creed at the local level have emerged as a relatively cohesive
group. Carter has shown that the AYCO membership spanned a
fairly wide age group which in 1986 ranged from early teens to
mid thirties (60). This tends to refute Eric Hobsbawm's thesis
that radical youth intelligentsia are politically volatile and
short-lived because the career prospects of their members lead
them out into other pursuits. This may have been true of
western student radicals. It does not necessarily accord with
a developing society like South Africa where many black
students face inferior education facilities and poor
educational prospects rendering them effectively a
lumpenintelligentsia (61).
The ANC leadership that has returned from exile since
1990 may face some difficulty in building up a cohesive mass
movement particularly as the radical intelligentsia in the
townships has been used to operating on its own initiative.
The return of the exiles has opened up a number of divisions
on generational and ideological grounds that may not be easily
resolved. The manner in which these divisions are handled is
crucial to the way the democratisation process develops.
A democratic transition?
58. Murphy Morobe, "Toward a People's Democracy: The UDF
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1987), p. 83.
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The previous analysis indicates that the theme of
democracy in South African political discourse has a
comparatively recent history which is characterised by an
uneven pattern of development given the periodic waves of
state repression. The ideals of democracy may have started to
become a dominant feature in South Africa political culture,
though they remain strongly contested between liberal
advocates of western-style representative democracy and more
radical concepts of "national democratic struggle". Democratic
ideals are stringly linked with wider forces of class and
nationalism in the society's politics. There is no unambiguous
trend towards democratisation.
The liberalisation of policy by the De Klerk government
since 1990 has, nevertheless, acted as a major test of the
ANC's commitment to wide-ranging democratisation. Formally,
its rhetoric has remained close to the Freedom Charter. Its
1988 Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa
championed basic human rights for all South Africa citizens in
an "independent, unitary, democratic and non-racial state".
These extend beyond "first generation" political rights to
"second generation" economic and social rights as well a Bill
of Rights and an affirmative action programme to eradicate
racial discrimination (62).
Some analysts have doubted the sincerity of this
commitment. For George Fredrickson and Marina Ottaway, the
alliance with the SACP and its basic identity as a liberation
movement lead it to have questionable democratic credentials
since no other African liberation movement has succeeded so
far in introducing a recognisably democratic political system
(63). For radical analysts such as Mike Morris and Doug
Hindson there is a danger that the ANC leadership will be
seduced into making a political deal with the central
government whilst ignoring local structures as the grass
roots. A 50% solution for Morris and Hindson risks escalating
the present phase of political violence in South Africa which
has emerged from the liberalisation of apartheid and the
removal of the state's monolithic and authoritarian control
over the fault lines of South African society (64).
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The evidence in the last two years appears to suggest
that there is considerable basis for both sets of concerns.
The ANC has tried to re-emerge as the authentic liberation
movement of the African people in South Africa whilst also
showing signs of moving towards an elite bargain made at the
political centre. It started with some advantages compared to
its rivals despite its long period of exile. In 1988 the
government banned the UDF and forcing many of its supporters
to merge into The Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). This led the
African trade unions organised in the Congress of South
African Trade Unions (COSATU) to take a for more prominent
part in the black political opposition movement. The MDM began
to stress socialist goals, though it hardly got off the ground
before the ANC was re-legalised (65).
The ANC felt that it could afford to ignore the UDF and
started to incorporate some of the local cadres into its own
organisation. The role of former UDF organisers in the
township struggles of the 1980s tended to be down-played on
the grounds that they were less experienced than those trained
in exile (66). The ANC leadership felt that it had to reduce
the influence of the hard-liners whether in the trade union
movement or Umkhonto as it undertook a diplomatic offensive to
gain international backing for negotiations with the Pretoria
government for a new constitution (67). Some radical
supporters, though still fear that the leadership might prefer
a civil rights strategy to one of revolutionary transformation
(68).
Radicals in South Africa perceive signs that ANC leaders
might abandon its commitment to democracy in a political deal
with the central government for a phased handover of power. To
some critics, such as Daryl Glaser, the democratic agenda is
in danger of being swamped by an "authoritarian sub-discourse
of national democracy" which distrusts the autonomy of
organisational activity and intellectual debate within the
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movement (69). Glaser though has been attacked for placing too
much faith in the "correct" socialist path which would produce
the conditions necessary, via equal citizenship, for a fully
flowering democracy. "Only the maturation of the South African
policy", Patrick Fitzgerald has written,
brought about by manifold processes of proactive effort
can create the democratic institutions, consciousness and
political culture required. A sphere of civic freedom
must however be woven out of the history and political,
social and cultural reality of the existing society. It
cannot be wished for or analyzed into existence. This
underlines the need to seek out sustainable discourses of
democracy within the indigenous experience" (70).
Any such sphere of civil freedom may take a considerable
period of time to mature. Fitzgerald is on unsure ground by
linking the ANC's democratic commitment in the 1988
Constitutional Guidelines to the "long tradition of South
African resistance politics" as opposed to the more immediate
need to respond to the crisis in Eastern Europe (71). As this
paper has tried to show, the democratic element within this
tradition is comparatively recent, dating back really to the
1950s and the Freedom Charter. Even then, it became superseded
by exile and the drift into liberation movement politics.
If a democratic bargain is to be crafted it may need a
considerable period of habituation for it to become
legitimised, perhaps even a whole generation. It is during
this habituation period, Rustow has suggested, that more
authentic democrats emerge for "the very process of democracy
institutes a double process of Darwinian selectivity in favour
of convinced democrats" (72). Radical South African democrats
may have to be satisfied with a process of democratisation
that is initially limited to the central government and the
result of an elite bargain between two rather authoritarian
political organisations. It may be only at a later date that a
wider democratisation process can occur as the local level as
the various radical intelligentsias get brought into a wider
process of democratic government: a similar pattern in fact to
English democratisation in the decades after the 1867 Reform
Act.
One alternative to this would be some form of pact made
between rival parties at the elite level that would guarantee
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the democratisation process. Di Palma has suggested that a
pact of this sort acts as a form of garantismo since it would
spell out the constitutional rules required for a
constitutional process of democratisation and so short-cut the
process of habituation (73). In South Africa such a pact would
have to centre on the powers of the police and security forces
and their capacity to destabilise black society through "black
on black" violence. The Boipatong massacre has, for the
moment, halted any process of familiarisation between the
National Party and ANC leaderships and has introduced a major
problem of political credibility for De Klerk if he choses to
try and restart the negotiations. It may still be the case
that some form of international role, possibly through the
United Nations, will be required to buttress such a pact that
limits the role of the security forces.
For the moment, therefore, the tentative democratisation
process in South Africa has run into the ground. The
protracted debate on democracy has not been able to exert a
decisive impact on political outcomes. Living in the
interregnum, a number of alternatives remain open for the
bureaucratic authoritarian state has not been dismantled. Much
of the old National Security Management system remains intact,
particularly through informal networks centred on Afrikaner
ethnic ties (74). It is impossible to discount a continuation
of the strategy of radical state restructuring from above that
commenced in the late 1970s involving the incorporation of
sections of the black elite and the re-negotiation of class
relations. This process could be potentially escalted into a
more wide-ranging model of a "revolution from above". This
would be the logical alternative to the democratisation
processes described here as the state itself acts a decisive
actor by pre-empting popular revolution through instigating
one of its own (75). The dynamic of this kind of revolutionary
change, however, is another story.
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